The liberation of the Falkland Islands from Argentine occupation 43 years ago this month transformed the standing of Margaret Thatcher’s government and appeared to show the UK was prepared to stop at nothing to defend its subjects.
The reality of the lead-up to a much-mythologised conflict is, however, more complex – as shown by Robert Elgood’s analysis of the backstory that culminated in Lt Gen Leopoldo Galtieri’s junta invading the territory on April 2, 1982.
Far from the robust stance history suggests, the academic presents a tale of haphazard diplomacy as successive British administrations considered offloading one of their remaining overseas assets with less consideration for a people who wanted to remain under the union flag.
The outcome was an occupation by an Argentine military regime notorious for human rights abuses and wholesale murder of its own citizens followed by a three-month war that claimed the lives of nearly 1,000 personnel on both sides.
Elgood, who in 1982 was a member of a lobby group representing the islanders and later gave evidence to Lord Franks’ probe into the causes of the conflict, presents a compelling account of the wider story while acknowledging his own unique perspective. This history shows, perhaps inevitably, that the root causes of wars are often far more complicated than they at first seem. We asked Robert Elgood about the legacy of the Falklands War...
Should an invasion of the islands have been expected back in 1982?
Very much so. The history has been largely forgotten but talks about sovereignty of the territory had been going on for years. Towards the 1980s, Galtieri’s junta had become very bullish and it should have been clear that an invasion was likely. My book focuses on the diplomatic story.
How impressive was the British military campaign?
There were some bold moves behind enemy lines and commanders were creative, for example, in working around setbacks that arose with helicopter shortages after the sinking of the supply vessel Atlantic Conveyor.
Could the Argentines have done more?
Brig Gen Mario Benjamin Menendez, the junta’s governor on the Falklands, did not lead as effectively as he could have in my view. He persistently held back, although there were some very good units available to him. The Argentine leadership, I believe, had considered replacing him.
Did victory change how the UK was seen globally?
Yes. The conflict was morally very clear cut – the UK did the right thing. The Argentine military junta had committed human rights abuses, including murder, against its own people. I think victory enhanced Britain’s standing in the world and the way it was viewed in South America.
Is the Falklands still a live issue today?
Yes – however, I don’t believe the Argentine claim to the territory is legitimate and I’m fully with the islanders on their right to self-determination. But until Argentina is convinced about this through sensible discussion the animosity will prevail. Politicians want to think this has been settled but it hasn’t. It would be far better for everyone if the dispute was ended.
